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Abstract:  
 
In this paper, the issue of income convergence in the EU-15 is addressed. Our data set 
consists of annual log real GDP per capita for the four Cohesion countries and cover the 
period 1950-2007.  
 
The empirical part of the paper applies complementary the Bernard and Durlauf (1995) and 
Nahar and Inder (2002) methodology.  
 
Applying the former, we failed to accept the hypothesis of stochastic convergence of real per 
capita GDP of the four Cohesion countries towards the EU-15 average.  
 
In contrast, the Nahar and Inder test provides strong evidence of convergence for Spain, 
Portugal and Greece.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, the crucial issue of income convergence is addressed, in the context of 
the four cohesion EU members (whose Gross National Income falls below 90% of 
the EU average). Ireland and Portugal, together with Spain and Greece, form the 
group of ‘cohesion’ countries within the European Union. This definition was 
established with the enlargement of the EEC to southern Europe, in 1981 and 1986, 
and was born out of the consideration that the integration into the Communities of 
the peripheral countries would imply certain measures to take into account structural 
and economic differentials in development levels (Lains, 2006). In terms of GDP per 
capita, all four countries fall below 75% of the EU average and contain some of the 
poorest regions in the Union itself. In addition to the existing economic disparities, 
all four countries are on the periphery of the Union, while two of the four, Ireland 
and Greece, are geographically remote (Thalassinos et al., 2015b; Chronis and 
Zombanakis, 2016).  
 
All four are classified, for purposes of Structural Fund aid, as lagging behind the rest 
of the Union, in terms of development and as such qualify for higher rates of 
economic aid. The growth experience of the four countries seems to be different 
(Thalassinos and Dafnos, 2015; Thalassinos et al., 2015a). Their long-term growth 
performance is associated with differences in the technical progress, the 
performance of the labor market, the level of education, the FDI and its share in 
manufacturing and service sectors, the tax regime for foreign profit earnings, etc.     
 
The empirical part of the paper applies two different tests of convergence.  In a first 
step, the Bernard and Durlauf (1995) methodology is used, according to which the 
existence of a Unit Root in the series of the differences between per capita GDP of a 
country and the average per capita GDP of EU-15 implies divergence. In a second 
step, a new procedure proposed by Nahar and Inder (2002) is applied. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
convergence hypothesis and reviews basic models applied in the relevant literature. 
Section 3 deals with the data set and gives a graphical description of the 
development in real GDP per capita in the cohesion countries. The empirical results 
are presented in the Section 4, while some concluding comments are made in the 
final section.   
 
2. The Convergence Hypothesis 
 
In the literature researchers define the convergence hypothesis in several ways. 
Following Sala-i-Martin (1996) “there is absolute β­convergence if poor economies 
tend to grow faster than rich ones”. 
 
Empirical tests of convergence fall into two categories. The first class of tests studies 
the cross-section correlation between initial per capita output levels and subsequent 
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growth rates for a group of countries. A negative correlation is taken as evidence of 
convergence as it implies that, on average, countries with low per capita initial 
incomes are growing faster than those with high initial per capita incomes. 
 
Let us consider the following model: 
  
   (1) 
 
where  is the logarithm of per capita output for economy  during 
period t, and  is economy i’s annual growth rate of 
GDP  between t and T. A negative value for β provides evidence in favour of 
absolute β-convergence, whereas β  0 supports non-convergence. See, for example 
Baumol (1986), De Long (1988), Barro (1991), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (1992). 
 
A second set of tests has examined the long-run behavior of differences in per capita 
output across countries. These tests interpret convergence to mean that these 
differences are always transitory in the sense that long-run forecasts of the 
difference between any pair of countries converges to zero as the forecast horizon 
grows. Convergence, according to this approach, has the strong implication that 
output differences between two economies cannot contain unit roots. Bernard and 
Durlauf (1995, 1996) state that countries i and j converge if  is a mean 
zero stationary process4.  
 
A new procedure is proposed by Nahar and Inder (2002)5. The test is based on a 
regression of the squared demeaned GDP per capita (the per capita output gap 
between each country and the group average) on a time trend t, such as: 
 
 (2) 
 
where,  (with  being the real per capita GDP of the individual 
country and  is the group average). For convergence to hold,  should always be 
getting closer to zero; the rate of change in  with respect to time would be 
negative, i.e. 
  
  is consistent with  as  (3) 
 
                                                     
4In general, time series approaches have rejected convergence (Bernard and Durlauf, 1995; 
Pesaran, 2004).   
5Nahar and Inder (2002) find quite strong evidence of convergence of the output of all 
OECD countries except Norway to the mean of the group, over the period 1950-1998. See 
also Bentzen, 2005; Galanopoulos et al 2006; Giles and Feng, 2005. 
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In that case, for convergence to hold, the average slope of the estimated equation has 
to be positive and significant. The average slope in compact form may be written as: 
 
(4) 
where,     
     
and 
,  
 
In that case, when testing for convergence the null hypothesis of no-convergence is: 
 
        against the alternative hypothesis (5) 
         
 
The r-vector can easily be calculated from the trend values and the θ-parameters are 
estimated from Equation (2) where the lag length is determined by e.g., the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Finally, a Wald-test is performed concerning the 
restrictions on θ as stated in the  hypothesis with rejection of the null hypothesis 
interpreted in favour of convergence. 
 
3. A Short Economic History of the Cohesion Countries’ Economy 
 
We obtained our data set from the Penn World Tables 6.3 of Heston et al. (2009). It 
consists of annual log real GDP per capita for the four cohesion countries and cover 
the period 1950-2007 (Figure 1). In the period 1950-1973, the three southern 
countries were the fastest growing economies in Western Europe, with real GDP per 
capita rising at an average annual rate close to 7 per cent, whereas Irish growth, 
although historically high, remained behind, at 3.7 percent (Lains, 2006).  
Performance in the period after 1973 was strongly influenced by the two oil shocks 
and by macroeconomic adjustment policies. Over the period 1973-1990 in Spain, 
performance was particularly poor compared with the previous period, while Greece 
fell back. In Portugal and notably Ireland, however, it was rather better. In fact, it is 
in this period that Ireland started to achieve the highest per capita GDP growth in 
Western Europe.  
 
In the period 1990-2007, there were only slight gains in relative incomes in Spain 
and Greece, while the performance of Portugal is less satisfactory since 2000. In 
Ireland, the growth of real GDP per capita accelerated to an average annual rate of 
6.6 per cent until 1998 and to a lower level during the last decade. Furthermore, 
three out of these four countries, experienced acceleration in growth after their 
accession, compared to their pre-accession growth trend (Figure 1). The Irish 5-year 
average growth rate after accession in 1973 was almost 1 per cent. Spain and 
Portugal experienced respectively a 3.6 per cent and 5.6 per cent increase in average 
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growth rates, after joining the EU in 1986. On the other hand, Greece’s growth after 
1981 was 3.2 per cent lower than before joining the EU (Brodzicki, 2003).   
 
All three Southern countries, benefited from the restoration of democracy in the mid-
1970s, but faced pressures for income redistribution that led to inflation, slower 
growth and balance of payments problems during 1975-84. However, whereas 
Portugal and Spain began adapting their institutions and policies in anticipation of 
EU (EC, then) entry, Greece delayed. Even after EU accession, Greece went for long 
grace periods, not rapid liberalization, and opted for an accommodating crawling 
peg rather than the ERM. Unlike Portugal and Spain, it used EU transfers to delay 
rather than promote fiscal and structural adjustment. (Alogoskoufis, 1995). The 
turning point for Spain, Portugal and Ireland came in the mid to late 1980s. Greece 
returned to consistent convergence only in the early 1990s (Barry, 2003). 
 
Figure 1. Per capita GDP of the Cohesion countries relative to France, 1950-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows clearly that, until 1990, the convergence process of 
these countries, with the EU average level, was weak. Secondly, it describes how 
much the paths of convergence of these countries have diverged. On one side is 
Ireland, with its extremely rapid convergence with the EU and, on the other are 
Spain, Greece and Portugal with a slower convergence process. Comparing with 
their starting levels in 1950, all four countries can be said to have succeeded in 
catching-up, at least to some extent, to the EU average. However, the experience of 
the four countries in this period was very different (Martin and Sanz, 2003).  
 
At the start of the sample period, Greece’s per capita GDP is lower of that of EU 
average, but during the period of high convergence in Europe, from 1950 to 1973, 
the gap had been quickly narrowing. According to Alogoskoufis (1995), the regime 
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before 1974 was characterized by commitment and coordination mechanism that led 
to high investment and growth but low inflation, fostering private investment by 
guaranteeing property rights in the constitution and the law, by the tax laws and their 
implementation, and by direct state control of labour unions. These mechanisms 
guaranteed high returns to capital accumulation. The post-1974 regime created 
distortions that not only discouraged private investment, but also caused a reduction 
in the social return on the investment actually undertaken. These distortions included 
the financial system, fiscal policy, the labour market, the 'natural' monopolies and 
public enterprises, public administration, investment grants and EC transfers 
(Alogoskoufis, 1995). However, it looks that after 1998 a catch up took place. Only 
over the course of the 1990s, convergence performance improved, both in income 
per capita and labor productivity terms (Barry, 2003). 
 
At the same starting time period, per capita GDP in Portugal was also consistently 
lower than that of the EU average. There has been a steady convergence of real per 
capita GDP to the EU average until 1973. The opening up to the European markets 
took off in 1959, with the accession to EFTA. Economic growth in Portugal during 
the EFTA years was led by the manufacturing sector and, in particular, by the textile 
industries and the heavy industrial sector. When Portugal joined the EEC in 1986, its 
manufacturing sector was already markedly different from the situation in 1973. The 
Portuguese economy opened up further to foreign trade and capital imports. 
Moreover, there were no relevant changes in the structure of manufacturing towards 
new and more productive industries of the kind we find in Irish growth in the 1990s 
(Lains, 2006; Freitas, 2005). 
 
Spain has been converging rapidly towards the EU average in 1950-1973. This fact 
was the outcome of the removal of barriers to imports, while there was heavy public-
sector involvement in industries, such as mechanical engineering, chemicals and 
energy production. However, the Spanish performance in relation to the EU average 
has been deteriorating in the period after the oil shock, (Martin and Sanz, 2003). 
Reforms in the areas of tax and financial systems, labor relations, education and 
state participation in industry began to take place in Spain ever since 1982. 
Furthermore, macro policies were reined in, and union-employer agreements in 1983 
and 1985 introduced some degree of wage restraint, (Barry, 2003). As part of its 
1986 accession, Spain liberalized its product market further and began to open and 
modernize its capital market. Monetary and fiscal policies were brought under 
control, and competition policy was strengthened in the later period. These reforms 
set the scene for a return to convergence, (Barry, 2003).  
 
In the first period, Ireland failed to converge. During this period, Ireland, like the 
other cohesion countries, remained protectionist. Furthermore, labor-market 
inflexibilities are seen to have played a role in accounting for Ireland’s poor 
convergence performance. During this period in Ireland, there was a coincidence of 
strong wage growth, high unemployment and high immigration. Irish wages were 
too high for labor-intensive industries to prosper, while the productivity growth rate 
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was lower than the EU average, (Barry, 2003). Convergence seemed to occur up to 
the early 1990s, with the country’s per capita GDP being very close to the EU-15 
average. Since the second half of the 1990’s, Ireland has outperformed the EU-15 
average, and has been consistently moving ahead of the average itself. According to 
Gottheil (2003), the first positive factor was the financial assistance from the 
European Communities, under the form of structural funds that were directed to 
infrastructural investments. More importantly, FDI from USA multinationals in 
computers, pharmaceutical and chemical industries expanded very fast in the 1990s. 
Other factor was the higher endowments in physical and human capital, as compared 
to the other cohesion countries (Lains, 2006). More specifically, the increase in the 
employment rate and labour supply by immigration, as Barry et al. (2001) conclude, 
led to the expansion of industries with higher productivity levels.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
We define as  the real GDP per capita of each country i at each time t, and  the 
average real per capita GDP of the EU-15. First, we test for convergence using the 
Bernard and Durlauf (1995) methodology, employing time series techniques. Table 
1 reports the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the demeaned 
output. Recall that, according to Bernard and Durlauf (1995), rejection of the 
hypothesis of a unit root in output deviation implies convergence. In all cases, we 
can not reject the null hypothesis of existence of unit root, as the value of the test 
statistic is well short of the rejection region. This finding indicates absence of 
stochastic convergence of real per capita GDP of the four Cohesion countries 
towards the EU-15 average6.  
 
Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root t-Tests (demeaned output ) 
Country Lag length Test statistic 
Greece 4 -2.3660 
Portugal 0 -1.6914 
Spain 4 -1.8278 
Ireland 0 1.5021 
Note: Lag length was chosen by AIC. Models include constant but not 
time trend. 5% critical value for the ADF tests is -2.9167 
 
Similarly, including a time trend in the unit root tests, according to the results of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the demeaned output (Table 2), none of 
the four countries is found to convergence stochastically to the EU average. The 
results of the Nahar and Inder (2002) methodology vary largely from the outcomes 
of the Bernard and Durlauf results. For convergence to hold, the rate of change in wit 
with respect to time t needs to be negative; i.e. . The 
                                                     
6Note that, stochastic convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
β­convergence 
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convergence hypothesis was set as that the average slope function is negative. To 
test the convergence hypothesis let us define the following null hypothesis: 
 
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root t-Tests (demeaned output ) 
Country Lag length Test statistic 
Greece 4 -2,2672 
Portugal 0 -0,71650 
Spain 4 -1,9862 
Ireland 3 -0,99192 
Note: Lag length was chosen by AIC. Models include constant and time trend. 5% critical 
value for the ADF tests is -3,4952 
 
        against the alternative hypothesis 
        
 
Thus the null hypothesis was set as no convergence. To test this, Equation (2) was 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), and then the Wald test was performed to 
test the restriction on the θ vector. The AIC was used to select the appropriate value 
of k for each country in estimating Equations (2) and (4); the selected polynomial 
order for each country is reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of average slope for testing convergence (Squared demeaned 
output gap from EU-15) 
Country 
 
Polynomial 
order (k) 
Average slope 
 
Wald test p-value 
Greece 5 -0.004708 129.2393 0.000 
Portugal 6 -0.008387 88.8476 0.000 
Spain 6 -0.003293 48.1426 0.000 
Ireland 6 0.001431 4.9983 0.025 
Notes: The optimal lag length is determined by means of AIC selection criterion.  
Restrictions in Equation (5) were tested using the Wald test. 
  
Table 3 represents the results of the convergence tests based on average slope 
estimates. Tests based on the squared demeaned output level indicate strong 
evidence in favour of the convergence hypothesis for each country except Ireland. In 
fact, Greece, Portugal, and Spain appear to be converging to the mean. The estimates 
of average slopes can be interpreted as the average rate of convergence for each 
country towards the EU average. Portugal is closing the gap with the EE average the 
fastest - at a rate of 0.84% annually while Greece and Spain show a more modest 
convergence pattern (0.47% and 0.33% respectively). On the opposite, Ireland has 
positive and significant average slope, suggesting divergence. The real GDP per 
capita of Ireland is moving away from the EU-15 at a moderate rate of 0.14% per 
year. In the case of Ireland, the rejection of the convergence case is mainly due to 
the very high growth rate of this economy, which creates a picture of divergence. In 
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fact, Ireland has not needed to converge, because convergence has already occurred 
prior to the sample period. 
 
5. Conclusions   
 
In this paper, we examine income convergence of the Cohesion countries with the 
average of EU-15 countries, by means of time series techniques. More specifically, 
both Bernard and Durlauf (1995) as well as a more recently proposed by Nahar and 
Inder (2002) test of unconditional convergence were applied. The former reject the 
stochastic convergence hypothesis, of real per capita GDP of the four Cohesion 
countries towards the EU-15 average, throughout the period under investigation.  
 
However, the results of the Nahar and Inder (2002) methodology vary largely from 
the outcomes of the Bernard and Durlauf results. More specifically, tests based on 
the squared demeaned output level provide strong evidence in favour of the 
convergence hypothesis for each country except Ireland. In fact, Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain appear to be converging to the average real per capita GDP of EU-15. In 
the case of Ireland, the rejection of the convergence hypothesis is mainly due to the 
very high growth rates of this economy, which create a picture of divergence.  
 
Failure to accept unconditional convergence is not uncommon in the literature. It 
appears that the group of cohesion countries included in the study is so diverse and 
heterogeneous, that perhaps it is necessary to control for these differences and test 
whether each country has its own steady state. Further research could be extended 
by introducing additional variables, as physical and human endowments, openness, 
FDI, and institutional quality, presently not included. 
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